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1. Climate Change Mitigation Policy in Brazil 
 
Brazil occupies a unique position among the major greenhouse gas (GHG) emitting 
countries due to its low per-capita energy-related GHG emissions (2.4 tons CO2 in 
2014), attributable to  Brazil’s abundant clean energy sources. The sources of major 
emissions have historically been concentrated in agriculture, forestry, and other 
land use (AFOLU), and are related mostly to deforestation, crop growing and 
livestock. Recently, deforestation in Brazil has slowed considerably, to the point 
where forestry has ceased to be the major source of emissions. Thanks to reduced 
deforestation, Brazil has reduced its overall GHG emissions by 41% from 2005 to 
2012, and its total GHG emissions per capita decreased from a high in 2004 of 14.4 
tCO2e to an estimated 6.5 tCO2e in 2012. 
Brazil faces the challenge of building upon its historically low energy-related GHG 
emission levels through new decarbonization strategies, while pursuing higher 
living standards for its population. Average annual income per capita in 2005 was 
only $4,767. Inequality, as evidenced by Brazil’s uneven income distribution, is a 
major problem. Brazil has made some progress in reducing income inequality in the 
last decade, thanks to the government consistently increasing the minimum wage 
faster than the inflation rate and social transfer programs (e.g. Bolsa Família). They 
decreased the Gini coefficient from 0.57 in 2005 to 0.53 in 2013, but inequalities are 
still a leading concern: in 2013, 15.5 million people in Brazil were living below the 
poverty line, of whom 6.2 million were living in extreme poverty.2 Inequality 
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between regions is also a problem; reducing these is the object of some regional 
incentive programs. 
Brazilian government considers that the country has been playing both a pioneer 
and a leader role in ambitious climate action.  
Pioneering efforts from Brazil include:  
- hosting in Rio de Janeiro the UNCED (United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development) in 1992, thus being the first country to sign 
the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Conference on Climate Change);  
- being the single non-Annex I country to present a proposal for the Kyoto 
Protocol, based upon the principle of historical responsibility in the building 
up of global temperature, and on the establishment of a Clean Development 
Fund (through penalties on non-compliance) that eventually has led to the 
creation of CDM (the Clean Development Fund), as one of the flexibility 
mechanisms of the adopted Kyoto Treaty.  
Leadership moves from Brazil in climate action include: 
- jumping ahead of non-Annex I countries in the announcement of voluntary 
mitigation targets prior to COP15 in 2009, in Copenhagen, departing from the 
G-77 and China previous position of refusing any mitigation commitments; 
and announcing a 2020 target that would imply a decline in absolute level of 
GHG emissions compared to 2005 (2 GtCO2e in 2020 against 2.1 in 2005); 
- Sharply curbing down of economy-wide GHG emissions, allowing to 
comfortably meeting the 2020 targets (total GHG emissions nearly stable 
around 1.2 GtCO2e from 2010 to 2014, against the 2020 target of 2); 
- Announcement of an intended nationally determined contribution (iNDC) at 
COP21 with an ambitious target of economy-wide 37% GHG emission 
reduction in 2025 and 43% in 2030, related to the level recorded in 2005 
(only the EU target is comparable in terms of high ambition). 
Brazil might be interested in joining an alliance of climate pioneers for a number of 
reasons, including, inter alia: 
 Access to international financial resources and to innovative financial 
schemes allowing to foster the tapping of mitigation opportunities 
 Playing a leader role in the deployment and export of mitigation 
technologies, both in the energy (e.g. biofuels) and forestry (monitoring and 
control of deforestation, planted forests, REDD+ projects) sectors  
 Current membership in BRICs initiatives, as the new development bank 
prioritizing investments in low-carbon infrastructure 
 Support of strategic actors, such as the ministries of Foreign Affairs and 
Environment, corporate coalitions, and notably at the sub-national level, 
including a number of municipalities belonging to the C-40 (currently 
chaired by Rio de Janeiro’s mayor). 
2. Brazilian Low Carbon Development  
 
According to a recent study including inputs of Brazilian experts from government, 
business sector and civil society3, there is a huge potential to reduce national GHG 
emissions through the implementation of a wide spectrum of mitigation measures, 
including: energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, low-carbon agriculture and 
cattle raising techniques, transport modal shifts, methane capture in the waste 
sector (landfills and sewage treatment stations), and reforestation with native and 
fast growth species. Large part of these mitigation measures are of low cost, such as 
those in the agriculture & cattle raising sector, energy efficiency and increased 
utilisation of renewable energy sources like hydropower and sugarcane ethanol. 
Adopting these measures can result in a significant level of additional mitigation in 
relation to current governmental efforts. If other measures are made viable, such as 
restoration of the Atlantic Forest, large-scale production of charcoal from planted 
forests, significant increase in intercity freight and urban passenger rail transport, 
it would be possible to reach in 2030 the level of 1 billion tCO2e, 25% lower than in 
1990 and a 49% reduction from 2005, a higher ambition than in the iNDC. More 
importantly, besides other environmental co-benefits, this deeper mitigation 
pathway can contribute to an increase in economic growth, a decrease of 
unemployment rate, and to an increase in average anual household income, with the 
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largest gain for the poorest families, contributing to a small improvement in the 
distribution of wealth, depending on the way in which they are implemented. 
There are various barriers, both economic or financial, as well as non-economic 
(legal, regulatory and institutional) for implementing such a high ambition 
mitigation pathway, and different means of overcoming them. Such means include 
microeconomic instruments and command/control tools, as well as innovative 
financial mechanisms to fund the higher upfront costs of mitigation measures.  
There are clear signs that the previous cycle of economic growth in Brazil has been 
exhausted, as indicated by the current economic crisis. After the adjustment policies 
to be implemented in 2015-2016, a new economic growth cycle must be sustained 
upon other basis. There is a wide consensus among Brazilian economists that a new 
development strategy should focus on higher investments in infrastructure. 
Therefore, given the huge potential of renewable energy resources in Brazil, a 
positive synergy emerges between the investment in low-carbon infrastructure and 
the starting of a new virtuous development cycle. 
This strategic vision of Brazilian objectives informs the requirements of climate 
clubs that may be of interest to Brazil: 
 The goal pursued by forging an alliance would be of GHG emissions 
mitigation contributing towards economic transformation and growth 
 it should supply ways and means to overcome the implementation gap, 
mainly through innovative financial mechanisms and technological 
development 
 sectoral priorities would be AFOLU – Agriculture, Forestry & Land Use, 
renewable energy, and energy efficiency. 
Table 1 illustrates Brazilian sectoral priorities for the case of mitigation technologies 
in the energy sector. The Brazilian iNDC falls within the range of the two Additional 
Mitigation scenarios of IES-Brasil (AM1 and AM2). According to the vision of nearly 
100 experts involved in the IES-Brasil study, and considering the assumptions of a 
fast economic growth rate up to 2030, achieving the Brazilian iNDC targets in the 
Energy Sector seems to be feasible. Moreover, if implemented through the adoption 
of appropriate public policies, the Brazilian iNDC can contribute to sustainable 
economic growth and improved social development while simultaneously reducing 
GHG emissions in Brazil.  
Brazilian participation in climate clubs helping its efforts to remove the barriers to 
higher penetration of renewable energy (hydropower and sugarcane products, but 
also biodiesel and other biomass sources, wind and solar energy) and energy 
efficiency would thus be of utmost interest. Such clubs might help not only in the 
implementation of the iNDC but also to its review towards a higher ambition, 
pushing it towards the level of IES-Brasil AM2 scenario.  
TABLE 1 - COMPARISON BETWEEN BRAZILIAN INDC  








Source: IES-Brasil (2015) 
 
    
TOTAL GHG EMISSION REDUCTIONS (compared to 2005) 40% 43% 35% 49% 
TOTAL ENERGY SUPPLY (Mtoe) 268.8  520.8 533.6 
%  Renewable Energy 45% 45% 46% 49% 
%  Renewable Energy without Hydropower 32% 33% 35% 38% 
%  Sugarcane products + Biodiesel 18% 18% 22% 22% 
%  Sugarcane 17,5% 16%  21% 21% 
% Hydropower in the National Interconnected Grid (SIN) 83% 66% 69% 71% 
TOTAL POWER GENERATION (average GW) 68.9  131.4 130.1 
% Renewable Power Generation 86% 81% 85% 87% 
% Hydropower 75% 66% 61% 63% 
% Sugarcane products + Other renewables 11% 23% 25% 24% 
TOTAL POWER GENERATION / GDP (av MW/billion R$ 2005) 25.3  23.7 23.0 
% of 2010 100  94 91 
Improvement of “electricity productivity" (related to 2010) 
(or efficiency gains in the electricity sector, in the iNDC)  
- 10% 6% 9% 
3. Using Climate Clubs to foster low carbon development in Brazil 
 
For helping Brazil to move faster on the road towards a low carbon economy, a 
climate club must provide the means to scaling up the investment in sustainable 
infrastructure, including additional financial resources and guarantees, and/or 
technological cooperation capable to trigger the deployment of sustainable energy 
technology. If a single climate club cannot deliver both kinds of incentives, the idea 
of joining multiple climate clubs also be an option for the Brazilian government. 
Follows a discussion of three examples of climate clubs supplying these incentives: 
a Positive Carbon Pricing club, a Sustainable Energy Technology club and a 
Sustainable Forestry club. 
 
3.1. A Positive Carbon Pricing Club 
Hourcade et al (2012, 2014, 2015) have developed an innovative financial 
mechanism to bridge the gap between available savings in a world flooded by a rapid 
expansion of liquidity and investment in low-carbon infrastructure. The Brazilian 
government adopted this idea and in a submission to COP20 Workstream 2 in Lima, 
suggested that “The Conference of the Parties should provide a clear political signal of 
its willingness to recognize the social and economic value of early and additional 
mitigation activities under the UNFCCC and to translate their verified results into units 
of convertible financial value, for the purpose of attracting investments and further 
promoting the implementation of national sustainable development policies by 
Parties“4. This submission was not adopted in Lima, but Brazil was able to include in the 
last version of the Paris Agreement a sentence where the Conference of the Parties 
“recognizes the social economic and environmental value of voluntary mitigation actions 
and their co-benefits to adaptation, health and sustainable development“ 
(COP21,UNFCCC (2015), paragraph 108). It could be the cornerstone of financial 
mechanisms to scale up the support to a low-carbon transition in Brazil and other 
non-Annex 1 countries. To do so, Annex 1 countries should commit to an amount of 
public guarantees on low-carbon investments assessed in function of an agreed social, 
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economic and environmental value of mitigation activities. According to Espagne 
(2015), this Positive Carbon Pricing Club fulfills the four conditions established by 
Nordhaus (2015) for a climate club definition. Moreover, this club might encompass 
other member besides states (as in the original definition by Nordhaus). Its benefit 
comes by a guarantee supplied to an emission reduction that may be induced by a 
corporate project, and even by a change in behavior within a household, in exchange 
of the agreed social value of carbon (SVC). As Espagne (2015) puts it, “This boost of 
value, the SVC, stems from a political compromise between the players of a club. It is 
therefore not a market price, but rather what one would call a notional price. This SVC 
serves as an anchor for the financial aid offered to a club’s player. This way, a low-
carbon project could be partially financed through certificates of emission reduction, 
highlighted at the level of this SVC. The financial sector would accept these certificates 
as loan repayments, insofar as their value would be guaranteed by the national public 
power”.  
Brazil has been struggling to increase investment in low-carbon infrastructure such 
as railways, waterways, ports and hydropower plants. Current investment rates are 
below 16% of GDP (15.5% in 2005), and do not reach the 18 to 21% required in the 
fast economic growth and additional mitigation scenarios explored by IES-Brasil. 
The government has been trying to establish public/private partnerships (PPPs) to 
fund these investments, with mixed results. International knowledge exchange and 
cooperation provided through a climate finance club might help to get the right 
conditions in place when designing the tenders to attract private capital into 
sustainable infrastructure. Moreover, such a climate club might help to integrate in 
this effort sub-national actors such as state governments and municipalities, who 
often lack the capacity to leverage the finance required to face the needs of building 
up sustainable cities and infrastructure.    
Alternatively, Brazilian Treasury has increased the capital of the National 
Development Bank (BNDES), the main funder of long-term investment in the 
country. However, according to international accounting rules, this operation 
increases public debt and the country’s risk, as accounted by international risk 
assessment agencies. If carbon emission reductions would be valued at the 
international level as financial assets, and guaranteed by Central Banks from a 
climate club of countries, it would slacken this constraint. 
 3.2. A Sustainable Energy Technology Club 
In Brazil, renewable energy accounted for 45% of total energy supply in 2010 (49% 
in 1990, 41% in 2000), and a huge potential of renewable energy remains to be 
tapped, with a potential increase in this share of renewables (see Table 1). 
Hydropower development was boosted by the creation of Eletrobras in 1964. In 
2010, 75% of total electricity consumption in the country was supplied by 
hydropower. In 2030, it would contribute 61 to 66% (see Table 1). Wind energy has 
recently taken off at a fast pace (more than doubling the installed capacity in 2014, 
from 2.2 to 4.9 GW, with a 2030 projection in the range of 25 to 30 GW). Solar energy 
is at an incipient stage of deployment, but recently approved regulations can remove 
some of the barriers to decentralized PV power generation. Potential for PV installed 
capacity in 2030 is estimated between 16.5 and 18.5 GW (IES-Brasil, 2015). 
Renewable charcoal produced from fast-growing planted forests (eucalyptus and 
pinus) is already an important energy source for the pig iron and steel production. 
There is potential to more than double current planted forest area in 2030 (from 6 
to 12-14 million hectares). Since 1975, Brazil has been using increasing volumes of 
ethanol from sugarcane as a car fuel. In 2010, ethanol production was of 27 billion 
liters, and sugarcane products (including bagasse) were able to contribute 17.5% of 
total energy supply. Production of second generation (2G) biofuels looks very 
promising in Brazil. The first two plants for ethanol production from sugarcane 
bagasse, using 2G technology for enzymatic hydrolysis of cellulosic materials, have 
reported yields of 24,800 liters/hectare per year (against current average of 6,800 
with conventional technology). Biodiesel is blended to diesel oil at 7% currently, but 
it could reach 15% in 2030, tripling production thanks to the use of palm oil as 
feedstock, besides soybeans and waste. 
International cooperation can accelerate technology development and speed up the 
deployment of renewables both in Brazil and abroad. Brazil has been trying to 
promote the production of biofuels in other countries, in order to make ethanol a 
global commodity. In the Technology Needs Assessment (TNA) to the UNFCCC, 
Brazil has included a section on its potential to share renewable energy technology 
with other parties.  Brazilian government has already indicated the intention to join 
the International Solar Alliance launched by the Government of India prior to 
COP21. 
 
3.3. A Sustainable Forestry Club 
Brazil has produced a remarkably successful record in sharply cutting deforestation 
by 80% in the Amazon from 2004 to 2010, allowing for a substantial reduction in 
the country’s GHG emissions (see Table 1). Half of this reduction is attributed to 
stricter enforcement of laws and regulations, and half to making the access of 
farmers to soft credit from public banks conditional upon compliance to the Forest 
Code and environmental permits.  Despite this success, the war is not over, as 
illustrated by Amazon deforestation increase of 16% in 2014. The main challenge 
remains to make cost-effective to keep the tropical forest in place, through the 
development of new technologies and markets for forest products. Besides REDD+ 
activities, the Amazon Fund managed by the National Development Bank (BNDES) 
is also supporting pilot projects with this goal, thanks to the financial support 
supplied mainly by Norway and complemented by Germany and international NGOs.  
Considerable experience has been accumulated in Brazil in the field of AFOLU, 
including: 
- Early warning systems for forest clearance and fire dectection, using satellite 
imagery; 
- Inventory of GHG emissions from land use change 
- Enforcement of Forest Code laws and regulations 
- Good practices in sustainable funding to farmers by public banks 
- Pilot projects for forest protection and sustainable use, including REDD+ 
activities 
- Low carbon agricultural practices, such as low tillage, biological fixation of 
nitrogen, agroforestry schemes 
- Forest plantations, both of fast growing species for commercial purposes and 
for native forest restoration (mainly in the Atlantic Forest). 
This experience can be shared with other forest countries. The Amazon Fund is 
already supporting projects abroad, in neighbouring Amazon countries. This 
initiative might be extended to Southeast Asia and African countries as well. 
Therefore, Brazil would have a strong interest in joining a Climate Club focusing on 
sustainable forestry, not only to find new ways to keep deforestation under control 
in the country, but also to share its experience with other forest countries. 
4. Conclusion: Low Carbon Development in Brazil and Climate Clubs 
 
Brazil has submitted a quite ambitious iNDC, and played a constructive role in 
COP21, joining the High Ambition club in the negotiations. There is a growing 
awareness in the country of the opportunities to foster development though the 
building of low carbon infrastructure and mitigation projects. Giving the high 
endowment of forests and renewable energy sources, Brazil is in a good position to 
play a leadership role in these fields, as illustrated by its recent achievements in the 
deployment of sustainable energy and forestry technologies. One of the key 
conditions for Brazil to play this role is the availability of financial resources to meet 
the upfront costs involved in the transition to a lower carbon economy.  
Therefore, climate clubs may play a helpful role to foster the transformation of 
Brazilian development pathway towards a low carbon economy. Brazil might join 
not only a High Ambition club (as it already happened in COP21), but also a number 
of other climate clubs focusing on innovative financial mechanisms and sustainable 
energy and forestry technologies. Besides the examples identified in section 3, and 
the International Solar Alliance jointly launched by India and France, one can also 
mention the joint EU/Brazilian initiative in COP21 of proposing a Sustainable 
Development Mechanism to succeed CDM as a booster of mitigation projects, 
included in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. 
Given the strong attachment of Brazil’s foreign Affairs Ministry to multilateralism, a 
key condition for Brazil joining these clubs would be a clear linkage with UNFCCC. 
Other conditions would include the ability of the clubs to provide goods such as 
knowledge exchange and additional financial resources for mitigation actions. 
A number of strategic actors in Brazil may be useful partners to help implementing 
and facilitating these climate clubs, such as: 
- the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must be involved in all climate clubs to ensure an 
appropriate linkage to UNFCCC and the alignment of the clubs with the general 
orientation of the Brazilian foreign policy 
- the Ministry of Finance (Fazenda), the Central Bank, the National Treasury, the 
ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCTI) and the National 
Development Bank (BNDES) would need to be involved in clubs targeting enhanced 
climate finance, and existing financial institutions such as the Future Stock Exchange 
(BMF), and the Green Stock Exchange (Bolsa Verde) may be useful partners of these 
clubs 
- the Ministry of Environment, the National Institute of Spatial Research (INPE), the 
Brazilian Enterprise of Agricultural Research (EMBRAPA) and BNDES would be key 
partners of a climate club focusing on sustainable forestry 
- the Ministry of Mines and Energy, its Energy Planning Agency (EPE), MCTI, BNDES, 
the Technological Center on Bioenergy (CTBE), Petrobras and Eletrobras would be 
useful partners of a Sustainable Energy club. 
Other actors might be involved in one or more of these clubs, such as the cities 
belonging to the C-40, some states, and corporate coalitions, such as the Brazilian 
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